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HOW CONGRESS PAVED THE WAY FOR
THE REHNQUIST COURT'S FEDERALISM
REVIVAL: LESSONS FROM THE FEDERAL
PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTION BAN
NEAL DEVINS*
In the pages that follow, I will link congressional debates over
partial birth abortion legislation to the Rehnquist Court's 19952001 revival of federalism. My claim is simple: The Rehnquist
Court was able to revive federalism, in part, because there was
no reason for the Court to fear political retaliation for its
federalism decisions.
Congress, interest groups, and the
American people do not care about federalism. On abortionrelated issues, pro-choice interests care about the pro-choice
agenda; pro-life interests care about the pro-life agenda.
Federalism does not figure into these agendas and, as such, it is
politically irrelevant to the debate over abortion. The political
fight over partial birth abortion exemplifies Congress's
uninterest in federalism. Specifically, there are virtually no
references to Rehnquist Court commerce clause decisions in the
debate over partial birth abortion legislation-even though these
decisions cast doubt on the constitutionality of a federal ban on
partial birth abortion.
Before turning to Congress's enactment of partial birth
abortion legislation, I will provide a brief summary of my larger
claim, that is, that the Rehnquist Court's revival of federalism is
tied to the fact that voters, interest groups, and lawmakers
routinely tradeoff federalism in pursuit of their favored

• Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary.
Thanks to John Barrett and Tim Zick for organizing the Federalism Past, Federalism
Future conference. Thanks to Allison Sawyer and Josh McKinley for researching
federalism-related issues tied to Congress' partial birth abortion legislation.
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substantive policy agenda.l Unlike issues such as gun control,
same sex marriage, and the death penalty, federalism is too
"abstract and complicated ... to engage the passion of citizens."2
Consequently, federalism is routinely undervalued in the
political process; voters, lawmakers, and interest groups, even
those who understand and value federalism, will nevertheless
have strong overriding preferences about one or more substantive
ISSUeS.

Single issue voters are a classic and extreme example of this
phenomenon. These voters are willing to subordinate secondary
preferences (including federalism) in order to secure their first
order preferences (typically the environment, civil rights, gun
control, or abortion). Abortion is a classic and extreme example
of this phenomenon. Pro-choice voters support freedom of clinic
access legislation and oppose bans on partial birth abortion. It is
simply irrelevant to pro-choice interests that both bills embrace a
broad view of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
For their part, pro-life voters are equally uninterested in
embracing a consistent view of Congress's commerce clause
power. They oppose clinic access legislation and support bans on
partial birth abortion. Likewise, pro-life interests traded off
federalism values in the Terri Schiavo case. Rather than accept
state court rulings that Ms.· Schiavo's feeding tube should be
removed, pro-life interests backed federal legislation remanding
the case to the federal courts. For pro-life interests, only one
thing mattered: the culture of life.3 ·
Single issue voters are certainly the exception, not the rule.
But the willingness of voters, interest groups, and lawmakers to
manipulate federalism in order to secure preferred substantive
policies is the rule. Self-interested voters and interest groups are
able to "move freely from one level of government to another in
an attempt to find the level at which they might try most
1 The balance of this paragraph and much of the next four paragraphs are drawn
from Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 131, 132-37

(2004).

2 John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Symposium: The Rehnquist Court: Federalism us.
States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial Reuiew in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 96
(2004).

3 See Charles Fried, Federalism has a Right to Life, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005,
at A17 (explaining how Terry Schiavo legislation ignored federalism values); see also Neal
Devins, Tom DeLay: Popular Constitutionalist, 81 CHI-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2006)
(giving a detailed treatment of congressional consideration of the Terri Schiavo bill).

2007]

LESSONS FROM PARTIAL BIRTH ABORTION BAN

463

advantageously to get what they want."4 Elected officials
understand this-invoking federalism when it comports with their
substantive policy agenda but otherwise ignoring the federalstate balance.
The historical record makes clear that all players in the
American political process are "willing to contemplate the
exercise of power by either level of government, depending upon
which level can more persuasively demonstrate that it can do the
better job."5 Consider, for example, the Reagan administration.
On the one hand, the administration strongly backed federalismissuing an executive order on federalism, pushing for state
control of federal grants, and asking the Supreme Court to return
power to states on abortion, school desegregation, and prayer.6
Despite this commitment to federalism, the administration was
willing to intervene at the state and local level to advance its own
agenda. In order to protect powerful business interest groups,
the administration sometimes backed away from its federalism
executive order.7 On social issues, the administration intervened
in the Baby Doe8 case, arguing that federal standards ought to
govern medical decisions involving infants born with severe
handicaps.9
From the Supreme Court's perspective, the lesson here is
simple: Unless judicial interpretations foreclose the pursuit of
first order policy priorities, it is unlikely that elected officials,
interest groups, or voters will formally and consistently embrace
any theory of federalism. More to the point: The Court need not
E.E. SCHATISCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 10-11 (1960).
James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power:
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L. J. 1003, 1010 (2003). See
Devins, supra note 1, at 134-35 (providing further examples of this practice).
6 See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 68-69, 134-35,
202-04 (2004) (discussing the Reagan administration's backing of federalism).
7 See DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 143-49 (1992) (demonstrating how the Reagan administration was
willing to circumvent federalism at times in order to advance its own agenda).
8 Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
9 The George W. Bush administration has similarly abandoned its ostensible
commitment to states' rights in order to pursue its social policy agenda. Among other
things, the administration sought to limit Oregon's physician assisted suicide law and
California's medical marijuana initiative. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Explore U.S.
Authority Ouer States on Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A5. The Bush
White House has also pushed for national standards on same-sex marriage and partial
birth abortion. See Carl Hulse, Senate Rebuffs Same-Sex Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, June
8, 2006, at A20; see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Expand Review of 'Partial-Birth'
Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2006, at Al4.
4

5
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fear a political backlash by embracing one or another theory of
federalism (or inconsistently pursuing a theory of federalism).10

***
Against this backdrop, Congress's consideration of partial birth
abortion legislation is especially instructive. Even though the
bill's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause was anything
but clear, lawmakers, interest groups, and the American people
ignored the bill's federalism implications. As I will soon explain,
there was no incentive for bill proponents or opponents to discuss
possible federalism objections to the bill.
Consequently,
lawmakers never discussed federalism-making the fight over
partial birth abortion a fight over first order policy preferences
(freedom of choice vs. sanctity of life).
To start, a few words about why the partial birth abortion ban
implicates the federal-state balance: When Congress first
debated the partial birth abortion ban (in 1995), the Rehnquist
Court had just decided United States v. Lopez,ll a decision
reinvigorating judicial limits on Congress's commerce power.
When enacting the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
(PBABA),12 Congress acted in the shadow of United States v
Morrison,13 a 2000 Supreme Court decision strengthening Lopez.
Lopez and Morrison spoke of the need for Congress to regulate
economic activity which substantially affects interstate
commerce. Under this standard, the constitutionality of the
PBABA is debatable.I4 First, there is reason to question whether
10 For reasons that the author and others have detailed, the Court must make sure
that its decisions are acceptable to the American people and their elected officials. See
Devins & Fisher, supra note 6; see also JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH
(2006); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
11

514 u.s. 549 (1995).

12 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (2006).
13 529 U.S. 598 (2000). In 2005, the Rehnquist Court embraced a broader view of
Congress' commerce power in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). And while Raich
certainly strengthens the commerce clause foundations of the PBABA, it is irrelevant to
the author's analysis. The author's concern is Congress' interest in federalism when
enacting the PBABA. At that time, the relevant cases were Lopez and Morrison.
14 For a further analysis of the constitutionality of PBABA see David P. Kopel &
Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and the Partial Birth Abortion
Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59 (1997); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The
Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367 (2002);
Allan Ides, The Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003 and the Commerce Clause, 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 441 (2004); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have the Constitutional
Power to Prohibit Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319 (2005).
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the regulation of a medical procedure is in fact, economic
regulation. Just as gun possession and domestic violence are not
commercial activities (notwithstanding their impact on the
economy), the absolute prohibition of one type of abortion
(irrespective of whether there is a monetary exchange) is
arguably a statement about morality that does not implicate any
commercial activity. Second, even if such abortions constitute
commerce, it may be that this infrequently used procedure _does
not "substantially'' impact commerce. After all, "a few million
dollars is a drop in the ocean of our national economy."15
This is not to say that the PBABA cannot be reconciled with
Lopez and Morrison. A strong case can be made that the PBABA
comports with Rehnquist Court federalism decisions.16
Nevertheless, the federalism issue is hardly a throw-away. In
1995, three law professor witnesses flagged this issue in
congressional hearings on the PBABA.17 Starting in 1997, law
15 Pushaw, supra note 14, at 336 (characterizing how an opponent of the PBABA
would argue that Congress lacks commerce clause authority to enact the bill).
16 For an explanation of how PBABA can be reconciled with other of the Rehnquist
Court's decisions see Pushaw, supra note 14, at 326. Indeed, federalism played no part in
lower court rulings on the PBABA In fact, all lower court rulings have invalidated the
PBABA as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's 2000 invalidation of a state ban on
partial-birth abortions. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006);
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc.
v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006). On Feb. 21, 2006, the Supreme Court agreed
to review the Carhart decision. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006). The
Commerce Clause issue was not raised in filings before the Court and there is no reason
to think that the Justices will tackle this question. Likewise, in deciding (on June 19,
2006) to review the Planned Parenthood v. Gonzales decision, the Justices gave no
indication that they would be considering federalism issues. See Gonzales v. Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006). On Nov. 8, 2006, the Supreme
Court heard oral arguments in the PBABA cases. Federalism played next to no role in the
oral arguments; it was not raised in the Carhart oral arguments and received just two
brief mentions in the Planned Parenthood Fed'n oral arguments. The first and most
significant mention occurred when Justice Ginsburg noted that the PBABA was the first
instance of Congress regulating abortion procedures and asked Solicitor General Paul
Clement "[h]ow should that weigh in this case?" Clement's response was telling; he
remarked that federalism should not figure into the Court's decisions "principally because
the other side in neither case makes a challenge based on the Commerce Clause."
Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2901 (2006) (No. 05-1382). The
second mention was a question by Justice Stevens about whether the Commerce Clause
would support application of the PBABA to "free clinics." Solicitor General Clement noted
that the government did not take a definitive position on this question because the
federalism issue had not been raised by plaintiffs in their challenge to the PBABA and,
consequently, the issue had not been briefed. Id. at 21-22.
17 For a discussion of this issue in the context of the 1995 Congressional hearings see
Partial-Birth Abortion: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House
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reviews started publishing articles questioning Congress's
commerce clause power to enact the PBABA.18 The Washington
Post, The National Review, and the Legal Times also published
opinion pieces raising federalism objections to the PBABA.19
But when Congress enacted the PBABA in 2003, these
federalism issues received no meaningful attention. 1% out of
214 pages of congressional debate raised the federalism issue.20
And while 40 Senators and 98 House members commented on the
PBABA, only two legislators (Senator Diane Feinstein (D-Calif.)
and Representative Ron Paul (R-Tx.)) spoke about federalism.21
More than that, Feinstein was the only lawmaker to suggest that
the bill was inconsistent with Rehnquist Court federalism
decisions. For its part, the House Judiciary Committee did
tackle the federalism issue in its report (although the report
makes no mention of the amount of money flowing nationwide
from partial-birth abortions).22 At the same time, Committee
members did not engage each other on this question. Outside of
a passing reference to the commerce clause issue by one law
professor witness, committee hearings did not consider
federalism issues at all.23 Likewise, the fourteen House Judiciary

Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 101-02 (1995) (statement of David M. Smolin,
Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University). For the statements of
Louis Michael Seidman, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center and
Douglas W. Kmiec, Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Notre Dame, see The
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1833 Before the S _ Comm_ on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 189, 193, 202-04 (1995).

18 For examples of law reviews that published articles questioning whether Congress
had the power to enact PBABA see Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 14; La·v, supra note 14;
Ides, supra note 14; Pushaw, supra note 14.
19 See Simon Lazarus, Next on Abortion: Supreme Collision, WASH. POST, Nov. 23,
2003, at B4 (raising objections to the PBABA); see also Jonathan H. Adler, One Bad Turn
Doesn't
Merit
Another,
NAT'L.
REV.
ONLINE,
Jul.
2,
2002,
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-adler070202.asp (questioning the
PBABA and the ways in which it offends federalism); Alan B. Morrison, Can This be

Legal? Another Bill on Partial-Birth Abortions, Another Bout of Constitutional Questions,

LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at 52 (questioning constitutionality of PBABA).
20 See Memo from Joshua McKinley to Prof. Devins, Federalism in the Congressional
Record on the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, June 1, 2006 (copy on file with the author).
21 To view the statements of the two legislators who commented on the PBABA and
federalism, see 149 CONG. REC. S12914, 12938 (daily ed_ June 4, 2003) for the statement
of Senator Feinstein, and see 149 CONG. REC. H4934, H4935 (daily ed. June 4, 2003) for
the statement of Representative Ron Paul.
22 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-58, at 23-26 (2003).
23 See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 760 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H_ Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 18 (2003)
(citing statement of Gerard V_ Bradley, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame).
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Committee members wh0 attached their "dissenting views" to the
Committee Report made no mention of the Commerce Clause.24
Congress's earlier consideration of the PBABA (in 1995 and
1997) also gave short shrift to federalism.25 In 1995, federalism
barely registered in congressional debates. Even though the
Supreme Court had just decided Lopez,26 less than 3 pages (out of
roughly 687 pages) of congressional debate touched on
federalism-related issues.
More than that, much of what
lawmakers had to say about federalism had nothing to do with
the constitutionality of the PBABA; the focus, instead, was about
the propriety of Congress intruding on state healthcare
prerogatives.27 Likewise, the House Committee Report on the
1995 PBABA never addressed the commerce clause issue; the
only mention of federalism is a reference (by those who voted
against the bill) to partial birth abortion being "properly a state
criminal and civil issue."28
States' rights arguments were virtually nonexistent in the
debates and hearings surrounding the 1997 version of the Act.
Only one lawmaker raised federalism in 158 pages of
congressional debates and that lawmaker (Senator Diane
Feinstein) did not speak about the bill's constitutionality under
the commerce clause. Instead, Feinstein spoke generally about

24 For a copy of the dissenting views to the committee report see H.R. REP. No. 10858, at 147-54 (2003).
25 See Katharine Q. Seelye, Veto Sustained on Bill to Ban Some Abortions, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1998, at A1 (explaining that President Bill Clinton vetoed partial birth
abortion legislation in 1995 and 1997 and that efforts to override his vetoes failed).
26 514 u.s. 549.
27 These arguments were made by both Democrats and Republicans, including
Republican opponents on the legislation. See 141 Cong. Rec. S16730 (daily ed. Nov. 7,
1995) (statement of Mr. Dole).
28 For a copy of the dissenting views to the PBABA, including the argument that
partial birth abortion is a state and not a federal issue see H.R. REP. No. 104-267, at 23
(1995). To their credit, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees did receive testimony
about the Commerce Clause from three law professor witnesses and one Senator. See

Partial-Birth Abortion: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 101-02 (1995). At that hearing, the Committee

received the statement of David M. Smolin, Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School,
Samford University. See The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R.
1833 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 189, 193, 202-04 (1995) for the
statement of Louis Michael Seidman, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center, and the statement of Douglas W. Kmiec, Professor of Constitutional Law,
University of Notre Dame; and the statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm.
on the Judiciary.
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states' rights issues.29 There was only one mention of federalism
in the 170 pages of published hearing testimony.30

***
Federalism did not figure into the debate over partial birth
abortion because neither pro-choice nor right-to-life interests had
any incentive to talk about such mundane issues as whether
abortion regulations are "economic" and whether the aggregate
impact of partial birth abortions "substantially affects interstate
commerce." Pro-choice lawmakers and their constituents (who
had previously backed a broad view of congressional power when
pushing for freedom of access to abortion clinic legislation) cared
about abortion rights, not the federal-state balance. They saw
the debate as a moral and legal debate about the right to choose,
especially efforts by right-to-life interests to chip away at Roe31
through the PBABA. Pro-choice lawmakers, in other words,
spoke to their base by speaking about abortion rights. Indeed,
because close to 70% of Americans backed the ban on partial
birth abortions,32 lawmakers who voted against the ban had
strong pro-choice leanings. For these lawmakers, the right to
choose was especially important to their constituents.
By
opposing the PBABA, these lawmakers sent a message that
resonated with their base.33
In 2003, moreover, pro-choice interests understood that their
legal position was strengthened by the Supreme Court's 2000
invalidation of Nebraska's partial birth abortion ban in Stenberg
v. Carhart.34 Perhaps for this reason, pro-choice lawmakers
thought that the courts would likely strike down the federal law
29 For the statement of Sen. Feinstein in regards to states' rights issues, see 144
CONG. REC. S10551, 10560 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1998). This statement was made in
connection to congressional efforts to override President Clinton's veto of the 1997 bill.

30 See Partial-Birth Abortion: Joint Hearing on S. and H.R. 929 Before the House
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 140 (1997) (including the statement of Louis Michael

Seidman, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
31 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
32 See
CNN/USA
Today/Gallup
Poll,
Oct.
24-26,
2003,http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm
(indicating that close to 70% of Americans supported the ban on partial birth abortions).
33 See Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining Why Senate Democrats
Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making but Not the Rehnquist Court, 73 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 1307, 1328-29 (2002) (discussing message politics and position taking legislation).
34 530 u.s. 914 (2000).
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and, as such, they could speak to their base about those issues
that truly mattered to them. In 1995 and 1997, pro-choice
lawmakers-knowing that President Clinton would veto the billalso thought they could speak to their base about first order
policy preferences.
For right to life lawmakers, the federalism issue was likewise
irrelevant. These lawmakers had previously backed a broad view
of congressional power when supporting legislation limiting the
transport of minors across state lines to have an abortion and
legislation making it a crime to harm an unborn child when
committing a violent crime against the mother.35 The thought of
opposing the PBABA because it threatened the federal-state
balance was a non-starter for these lawmakers.
Their
constituents were intensely interested in right-to-life issues, not
federalism.
Moreover, since pro-choice interests were not
attacking the bill on commerce clause grounds, there was no need
to start a conversation about an issue that was irrelevant to their
base.36 And with the Supreme Court's Carhart37 decision casting
its shadow on the 2003 debates, right-to-life lawmakers focused
their legalistic energies on distinguishing the federal PPABA
from the Nebraska statute invalidated in Carhart.38
The dearth of discussion about the Commerce Clause or states'
rights issues in the legislative hearings, reports and debates over
partial birth abortion is to be expected. Interest groups, the
American people, and lawmakers care about first order policy
priorities. Sometimes that means supporting measures that
embrace a broad view of congressional power; sometimes that
means opposing such measures. As such, there is nothing to be
gained and much to be lost by taking federalism seriously and
35 See Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, H.R. 748, 109th Cong. (2005)
(limiting the transport of minors across state lines for the purpose of obtaining an
abortion); see also Child Custody Protection Act, H.R. 1755, 108th Cong. (2003) (making it
illegal to transport minors across state lines for the purpose of obtaining an abortion and
thereby allowing the minor to obtain an abortion without parental notification in states
that require such notification); Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 118 Stat. 568 (2004)
(protecting the rights of unborn children in the face of violent crimes).
36 The fact that lawmakers could have strengthened their handiwork by making
specific findings about the economic impact of the PBABA did not matter to right to life
lawmakers. See Pushaw, supra note 14, at 336. Instead, reflecting Congress's general
uninterest in constitutional questions, lawmakers focused their energies on symbolic
statements that mattered most to their constituents. See Devins, supra note 33, at 132829.
37 530 u.s. 914.
38 Id.
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calling upon the courts and Congress to police the federal-state
balance. Mter all, neither pro-life nor pro-choice interests want
their views of the federal-state balance to cabin their ability to
support legislation that backs up their favored policies.
It therefore comes as no surprise that the national political
process will not police federalism-based limits on Congress's
powers. Likewise, because federalism is a low salience issue, the
courts have substantial leeway to reinvigorate f~deralism.
Unless Court federalism decisions significantly limit the
dominant political coalition's first order policy priorities, there
will be no federalism constituency pushing elected officials to
retaliate against a too aggressive Court.39 Consider, for example,
the PBABA. Were the Court to invalidate the statute on
commerce clause grounds,40 pro-life interests would turn their
attention to other "culture of life" issues. Rather than pursue a
reconfiguration of Court federalism decision making (most of
which has nothing to do with abortion), these interests would
pursue other measures restricting abortion and, more generally,
embrace states' rights on abortion-related decision making. For
their part, pro-choice interests will not embrace limitations on
Congress's Commerce Clause power- even if the Court were to
invalidate the PBABA on Commerce Clause grounds. 41 In
particular, pro-choice interests recognize that they too would pay
a price if the Court were to narrow Congress's powers-for prochoice interests sometimes push for laws that embrace a broad
view of Congress's powers under either the Commerce Clause or
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

33,

1320-23.

39 For more detailed discussion, see Devins, supra note
at
40 For reasons detailed above, it seems unlikely that the Commerce Clause issue will

be considered by the Supreme Court in its review of the PBABA. This is because the most
pressing issues raised by the PBABA do not surround the Commerce Clause. Instead they
center on a person's views towards abortion in general. For a discussion on PBABA and
the Commerce Clause see Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 14; Law, supra note 14, Ides,
supra note 14, Pushaw, supra note 14. See also supra text accompanying note 16,
remarking that federalism played no meaningful role at oral arguments in PBABA cases.
41 In opposing the Supreme Court review of a lower Court decision invalidating the
PBABA, pro-choice interests never referred to the Commerce Clause implications of the
PBABA.
See
Respondents'
Brief
in
Opposition,
http://www.crlp.org/pdf/Op_Cert_Carhart_Final.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2006). The brief
argues that the Supreme Court addressed the issue at hand five years ago when it struck
down a similar statute banning partial birth abortions in Stenberg v. Carhart. See The
Federal Abortion Ban: Headed to the Supreme Court, http://www.crlp.org/crt_pba.html
(last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
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It is time to wrap up: The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003 exemplifies the irrelevance of federalism to the American
political process. Even though this piece of legislation was
extremely controversial, lawmakers, interest groups, and the
American people ignored federalism based objections to the
law.42 The PBABA is also instructive in understanding the
Rehnquist Court's 1995-2002 revival of federalism. Not only
were lawmakers unlikely to police federalism in any meaningful
way, there was little reason for the Court to fear that its revival
of federalism would prompt a political backlash. Interest groups
care about their substantive agenda, an agenda which sometimes
supports and other times opposes a broad view of national power.
The PBABA is a classic example of this phenomenon: There was
absolutely no reason for pro-choice or pro-life interests to think
that a narrow or expansive approach to federalism would
meaningfully assist them. As such, there was no reason to resist
or embrace Court rulings on federalism-based limits to
congressional power.

42 The same can be said of journalists. Outside of a handful of opinion pieces, no news
story about the PBABA in the New York Times, Washington Post, L.A. Times, and the
Wall Street Journal discussed the federalism implications of the law. See generally
McKinley, supra note 20.

